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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RALPH 
CHACON, WILLIAM MICHAEL NOAH and MA-
RINES H. MEYERS III, Defendants and Appellants. 
[1&, 1b] Criminal Law-Appeal-Reversible Error-Counsel.-Jn 
a prosecution of four defendants jointly charged with mali-
cious assault with a deadly weapon by a life prisoner, the 
refusal of the trial judge to provide separate counsel for each 
of three defendants deprived them of the right to the effective 
assistance of counsel requiring reversal of judgments as to 
both guilt and penalty, where at no time did the court indicate 
[1] Duty of court when appointing counsel for defendant to 
llame attorney other than one employed by, or appointed for, a 
eociefendant, note, 148 A.L.R. 183. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal 
Law, § 156; Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 319. 
!ticK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 1359; [2] Criminal 
Law, §107(15)j [3] Criminal Law, §107(11); [4] Criminal Law, 
§ nO(8); [5] Criminal Law, § 107(15); [6] Criminal Law, 
§ 107(22); [7] Criminal Law, § 1382.2(1); [8] Criminal Law, 
§ 391(1); [9, 10] Criminal Law, § 264(4); [11] Witnesses, 
,275(1); [12] Witnesses, § 270; [13] Witnesses, §§ 273, 275(1); 
[14] Witnesses, § 273; [15-17] Assault and Battery, § 46. 
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to these defendants that separate counsel might he appointed 
for each of them, where their only choice was to acct'pt one 
attorney for all or proceed without an attorney, and where, 
although a common defense was 'presented by counsel repre-
senting all three defendants and the record was silent as to 
evidence that might have been developed on behalf of each if 
separately represented, the facts of the case were fraught 
with potentially effective individual defenses which could not }' 
be presented by counsel common to all three. 
Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Codefendants.-The _: 
right to counsel at trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution and Cal. Const., art. I, § 13, 
does not include an automatic right to separate counsel for 
each codefendant, and one counsel may represent more than 
one defendant so long as the representation is effective. 
Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Adequacy of De-
fense.-Elfective assistance of counsel is assistance untram-
meled imd unimpaired by a eourt order requiring that one 
lawyer shall simultaneously represent conflicting interests; and 
I 
/' 
if counsel must represent conflicting interests or is ineffective 
because of the burden of representing more than one defend-
ant, the injured defendant has been denied his constitutional 
right to effective counsel. 
Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Implied Waiver 
From Conduct or Lack of Request.-In a prosecution of four 
defendants jointly charged with malicious assault with a 
deadly weapon by a life prisoner, if defendants were denied 
the right to effective representation of counsel, the appellate 
court cannot imply or presume that the right was waived by 
their silence or by their failure to request separate counsel 
where the court did not advise them of their right to separate 
counsel if a conflict was prescnt. (Disapproving People v. 
Winklespecht, 237 Clll.App.2d 227 [46 Cal.Rptr. 697.], People 
v. Byrd, 228 Cal.App.2d 646 [39 Cal.Rptr. 644], and People v. 
Sprinkle, 201 Cal.App.2d 277 (19 Cal.Rptr. 804], insofar as they 
are to thc contrary.) 
Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Codefendants; Con-
flict of Interest.-In a criminal prosecution of multiple 
defend:mts, conflicts of intl'rest necessarily exist when the 
jury must fix the penalty for more than one defendant, and 
the conflict is not limited to the trial on the issue of penalty, 
for normally the Rallle jury deterlllines both the issue of guilt. 
and the issue of penalty. 
ld.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Review.-The right 
to have the ll.ssistllnee of counsel in a crilllinal prosecution is 
too fundamental anel ahsolute to allow courts to indulge in 
nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its 
denial 
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[7a, 7b] Id.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Evidence of Other 
Offenses.-In a prosecution of four defendants jointly charged 
with malicious assault with a deadly weapOn by a life prisoner, 
the prejudicial effect of admissible cumulative testimony of a 
prison records officer that each of the four defendants was 
serving a life term at the time of the alleged offense, listing all 
the convictions for which each was serving time, a total of 
nine violent or dangerous felonies for all of them, outweighed 
the legitimate purpOses served by its admission where, at the 
outset of the trial the jury was presented with the picture of 
four hardened, vicious convicts charged with another offense 
in a long line of similar violent offenses, where both defense 
counsel were willing to stipulate that the four defendants were 
serving life terms, and where the prosecuting attorney would 
agree to such stipulation only if commitment records were 
admitted for his use in argument, thus indicating full aware-
ness of the prejudicial effect of the testimony and a wish to 
make full advantage of it. 
[8] Id.-Evidence - Competency and Materiality - Evidence of 
Former Offense Showing Guilt in Present Action.-When a 
prior conviction is an essential element of an offense, it is 
admitted to prove something other than the defendant's bad 
character, and is admissible for that purpose. 
[9] Id.-Trial-Custody and Control of Defendant.-In a prosecu-
tion of four defendants jointly charged with malicious assault 
with a deadly weapon by a life pri,soner, the jury was not 
prejudiced by the appearance of each defendant throughout 
the trial handcuffed and in prison garb where it appeared thut 
the restraints were reasonable, that all defendants were simi-
larly treated for at least some parts of the trial, that no I('g 
chains were used and there was no evidence of excessive use of 
guards in the courtroom, that there was no objection to the 
handcuffs or clothing by defendants, that during the 'Voi,. di,.e 
the trial judge, prosecuting attorney, and defense attorneys 
inquired whether the jury would be affected by the handcuffs 
in making their decision to which all respOnses were negativ(', 
and that the prosecutor in argument to the jury emphasized 
that they should not be prejudiced because defendants were in 
handcuffs, defense counsel similarly admonished the jury, and 
did not request a similar admonition by the court. 
[10] Id.-Trial-Custody and Control of Defendant.-A defend-
ant may be required to undergo reasonable restraints when 
they are necessary to assure his detention or to maintain order 
in the courtroom. 
[11] Witnesses-Impeaching One's Own Witness-Inconsistent 
[8] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 137 i Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 321 
, et seq. 
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Statements.-In a prosecution of four defendants jointly 
charged with malicious assault with a deadly weapon by a life 
prisoner, the testimollY of the ('ollviet assault victim, a neces-
sary witness iu the prosecution's case, aud of two correctional 
counsellors at state prisons, was admissible, where the victim 
testified for tile prosecution, stated he had started the fight, 
had spoken with a correctional officer but had not implicated 
defendants, had not said he would refuse to testify for the 
state out of fear. and did not presently fear the defendants; 
where his testimony was evasive and uncooperative; where one 
correctional counsellor then testified to a conversation with 
the victim in which the latter said nothing about starting the 
fight, said all four defendants had stabbed him, and said he 
would not testify for the stnte because he did not wish to be 
considered an informer; and where the other correctional offi-
cer then testified regarding the "convicts' code," described as 
an unwritten rule that prison inmates be silent about. prison 
disciplinary matters. \1 
[12] Id.-Impeaching One's Own Witness.-One of the purpose~ 
of Evid. Code, § 785, relating to attacking the credibility of a 
witness, is to allow a party to use and impeach a hostile! 
witness that he had called. 
[18] Id.-Impeaching One's Own Witness-Showing of Hostility: 
Inconsistent Statements.-In a prosecution of four defendants 
jointly charged with malicious assault with a deadly weapon 
by a life prisoner, prosecution impeachment of the convict 
assault victim called as a witness by it by the use of a prior 
ineonsistent statement was proper where a correctional coun-: 
seller at a state prison testified that in his previous statements 
the victim had described the event differently and indicated, 
fear of defendants; and the correctional officer's testimony as 
to the victim's fear of defendants was also admissible to show 
bias of the witness in favor of defendants. 
[14] Id.-Impeaching One's Own Witness-Showing of Hostility. 
-In a prosecution of four defendants jointly charged with 
malicious assault with a deadly weapon by a life prisoner, tes-! 
timony of the correctional officer at the prison as to conditions i 
generally existing in prisons and their effect on the veracity of ! 
prisoners was relevant and admissible to show circumstances 1 
affecting the bias of the convict. assault victim, called as a 1 
prosecution witness in favor of defendants, where the witness 
did not give his opinion on the guilt or innocence of defend- I 
ants, and testified, not that the assault victim was lying, but 'I' 
that the conditions under which he lived might compel him to 
lie. 
[15] Assault-Assault by Life Convict-Instructions.-In a prose-
(lution of four defendants jointly charged with malicious 
[15] See Cal.Jur.2d, Prisons and Prisoners, § 102 et seq. 
Nov. 1968] PEOPLE v. CHACON 769 
[69 C.2d 765; 73 CaJ.Rptr. 10. 447 P.2d 106) 
assault with a deadly weapon by a life prisoner, the instruc· 
tions on malice aforethought were inadequate where the trial 
judge instructed that an essential element of the otrens!' st:ltl'II 
in Pen. Code, § 4500, proscribing assaults by a life prisoner, 
was that the assault be committed with malice aforethought, 
that the term denoted purpose and design in contradistinction 
to accident and mischance, and was used to denote the purpose 
and design of the assaulting party, and that in order to estab· 
lish guilt it was not required that the assault be made with 
intent to kill, rather than following the definition developed 
under Pen. Code, §§ 187 and 188, in instructing on malice 
aforethought. 
[16] ld.-Assault by Life CODvict-IDstructioDs.-Pen. Code, 
§ 4500, proscrihing assaults by a life prisoner, expressly re-
quires that an assault punishable therein must be "with malice 
aforethought"; the words malice aforethought in § 4500 have 
the same meaning as in Pen. Code, §§ 187, 188, relating to mur-
der and malice, and the rules regarding malice aforethought as 
an element in a charge of murder apply to § 4500. 
[17] ld.-Assault by Life CODvict-InstructioDs.-In a prosecu-
tion of four defendants jointly charged with malicious assault 
with a deadly weapon by a life prisoner, the trial court's 
refusal to give defendants' requested instruction on the issue 
of provocation, although he did instruct on the issue of self· 
defense, was erroneous, where, by refusing the instruction, he 
foreclosed the possibility that even though the defense of self-
defense failed, as it might have for excessive retaliation by 
defendants, the jury might still have found the original attack 
by the convict victim sufficient to constitute provocation which 
would have precluded a finding of malice aforethought, an 
essential element of the offense. 
APPEALS, two automatically taken under Pen. Code, 
§ 1239, subd. (b), from judgments of the Superior Court of 
Monterey County. Gordon Campbell, Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecutions for malicious assault with a deadly weapon by 
life prisoners. Judgments of conviction imposing death penalty 
as to two defendants and life imprisonment as to tllird defend-
ant reversed. 
LeRue James Grim, Ralph R. Lopez and Ollie M. Marie-
Victoire, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Albert W. Harris, Jr., 
Assistant Attorney General, and Michael J. Phelan, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
88 C.2d-25 
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TRAYNOR, C. J.-Ralph Chacon, William Noah, Marines 
Ml'yers, and Ernest Garcia wpre jointly charged with violat-
ing Penal Code section 4500 (malicious assault with a deadly 
weapon by a life prisonrr). Chacon, Noah, and Meyers 
pleaded not guilty and 110t guilty by reason of insanity. Gar-, 
cia pleaded not guilty. A jury returned verdicts of guilty 
against Chacon, Noah, and Meyers, but was unable to reach a 
verdict as to Garcia, and the trial court declared a mistrial as 
to him. After a trial on the issue of sanity, the jury found 
that Chacon, Noah, und Meyers were sane at the time of the 
offense. After a trial on the issue of penalty, the jury fixed the 
punishment for Chacon and Noall at death and for Meyers at ,I 
life impri:>onment. The trial court denied Chacon's and 
Noah '8 motions to reduce the prnulty to life imprisonment 
and entered judgments on tIle verdicts. The appeals of Chacon 
and Noah ~re automatic (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b». The 
appeal of Meyers is pursuant to a timely notice of appeal. j, 
On April 30, 1967, approximately 14 prisoners were housed 
in separate cells in the maximum security section of the Cor-
rectional Training Facility at Soledad. The maximum security 
section consists of single cells fl·onted by a passageway or tier. I 
Guards are stationed at one end of the tier, and on the day of 
the incident Officcrs Nance and Fagen were on duty there. 
At 10 a.m. five prisoners, Chacon, Noah, Meyers, Roger 
Smith, and Vernon Byrd, were released from their cells to 
exercise on the tier. Chacon, Noah, and Meyers wore skull 
caps with swastikas painted on them. At approximately 10 :15 
the attention of both guards was drawn to a disturbance on 
the tier. The two officers observed a scuffle between Smith, 
Chacon, Noah, and Meyers approximately 65 feet in front of 
them. Warning systems were sounded and Officer Fagen 
shouted to the inmates to "lock-up" (reenter their cells). 
Only Byrd complied with this order. Officer Knox, who was 
guarding the isolation cells nearby, joined Officers Nance and 
Fagen. The three offirers saw Noah, Chacon, and Meyers 
crowded around Smith who was being held on the floor. Each 
of the three defendants had a knife. Each repeatedly stabbed 
Smith while the others held l.im. Noah and Chacon then 
dragged Smith approximately 40 feet and propped him in 
front of Garcia's cell. Chacon gave Garcia a knife, and Garcia 
reached out through a food slot in the cell door and stabbed 
Rmith. Noah, Chacon, and Meyers then went to Noah's cell 
and locked themselves in. Officer Nance approached Noah's cell 
where he saw tIle three defendants laughing. When, asked if 
his "buddy" had kliifed Ilim, Noal) answered "That's what 
) 
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llappened, Sarge." When the officers approached Garcia's 
cell and asked where the knife was, Garcia replied that he had 
thrown it away. 
The officers found three knives on tIle tier: two icepiek typc 
weapons and one dagger. One icepick had been fashioned from 
part of a hair brush; the rest of the brush was in Noah's cell. 
The swastika caps were also in Noah's cell. One officer testi-
fied that he saw Meyers throw a knife away before he entered 
Noah's cell. 
Three physicians operated on Smith for five hours. He had 
multiple puncture wounds throughout his body and was in a 
critical condition for severa I days. 
The records officer at Soledad testified that each of the four 
defendants was serving a life term, and that none of their 
indeterminate sentences had bren set by the Adult A nthority. 
Eight inmates testified for the defense: Noah, Meyers, Gar-
cia, four other inmates present at the time, and the victim, 
Smith, who was called as a prosecution witness but gave testi-
mony favorable to the defense. Except for minor descrepancies 
in detail, all gave similar testimony. 
The crucial defense was that none of the officers had sr('11 
the fight begin and that Smith had started it. Smith and 
defendants had been together at various prisons, w11ere ani-
mosity had developed between them. Before being placed ill 
maximum security Smith had been in isolation near defend-
ants' cells and while there had constantly shouted threats and 
profanities at them. He had also had trouble with the prison 
guards. On the day of the offense Smith made a homosexual 
advance to Meyers. Noah told Smith to stop it. Smith tl](,11 
drew a knife and attacked Noah. Meyers came to Noah's 
defense, and Smith stabbed him also. In self defense, both 
Meyers and Noah drew their own knives and began stabbing 
Smith in return. Chacon then intervened in an attempt to 
break up the fight. He first struck Smith with his fist, stun-
ning him and causing him to drop his knife. Cllaeon t)]('Il 
picked up the knife to keep it from Smith, while continuing to 
attempt to break up the fight. Chacon did not stab Smith. 
Chacon and Noah then dragged Smith in thc direction of 
Garcia's cell, but Garcia did not stab Smith. 
Two psychiatrists testified for the prosecution at the trial 
on the issue of sanity. Dr. Raymond Hack, cOllsultant at 80]('-
dad for the past 12 years, testified that he llad examined 
Chacon, Noah, and Meyers and that on the basis of his exami-
nations and a review of their records it was his opinion tllat 
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each was sanc at the time of the assault. Dr. Robert Noce, a 
psychiatrist employed by the Monterey County Hospital, testi-
fied that on the basis of his examination of the three defend-
ants, it was his opinion that each had a sociopathic personal-
ity, but was sane at the time of the offense. 
Three inmaies in addition to Meyers and Noah testified for 
the defense. Inmates Garrett and Branch testified that they 
had seen Noah often act so erratically that each considered 
Mm insane. Inmate Solis testified for defendant Chacon that 
he too often acted erratically and often went into "twilight 
zones" in which he became extremely noncommunicative. 
Noah and Meyers testified that they had never described the 
incident to the psychiatrists. 
At the trial on the issue of penalty the prosecution sub-
mitted its case on the evidence at the trial on the issue of 
guilt and tl1e trial on the issuc of sanity. Chacon, Noah, and 
Meyers each testified in his own behalf. 
At the outset we note tllat with respect to Chacon and 
Noah, there was error such as that condemned in Witherspoon 
v. IUillois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 521-523 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 784-
786,888.Ct.1770]. 
Five of the nine jurors were excused for cause on the 
ground of t1wir opposition to the death penalty before they 
had made it "unmistakably clear" that they would "auto-
matically" refuse to vote for the death penalty. (Wither-
spoon v. Illinois, st/p"a, 391 U.S. 510, 522 fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d 
776, 785].) One juror was excused when she answered, "I 
think I would," when asked whether she "would . . . have 
any objection to rendering a death verdict" if the facts and 
law warranted it. Three jurors were dismissed when they 
answered that they "would not be able to sign the [death] 
verdict as foreman." 'fhat answer indicated that they would 
not undertake what they regarded as the greater moral bur-
den of the jury foreman, but it did not show that they would 
have refused to vote for the death penalty.1 Finally, a fifth 
juror was excused who answ(,red, "I don 't think so" when 
lOne of tlwse tllI'ee jUl'ors was excused although he was even more 
indecisi\'e when IIsked whether he would sign his name to the verdict as 
foreman. When asked if he had ohjections to the imposition of the death 
penalty he stnted that he dit!. \\11C1I asked if he would nevertheless return 
II verdict of denth if the facts called 1'01' it, he replied that he was not 
opposed to the death penalty RK slleh but jll~t to the way it was admini~­
tercIl, und then he ('Ial'ifiell his "llIh'ment with nil explanution thl1t be 
wus 1I0t (,ppo~ed to th,' Jputh ,,,·nalty if 11,1' fnctH call,·a for it. '1'111.' jlll'or 
was Ihen askl'd ",h,·tlu',' I,,· "oul<l sigll hili ,"""1' 8S fOfl'IIIUIl to u <leat.h 
penalty verdict and he answered "I aw afraid not." He was then 
excused. 
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asked if he could impose the death penalty. lIe was not 
allowed to give an unambiguous yes or no answer to the ques-
tion. This error would require at the least a new trial for 
Chacon and Noah on the issue of penalty. 
[la] We have concluded, however, that all three judg-
ments must be reversed as to both guilt and penalty on the 
ground that the refusal of the trial judge to provide separate 
counsel for each defendant deprived them of the right to the 
effective assistance of counsel. 
The four defendants appeared at their arraignment with 
out counsel. The court appointed Mr. Ralph Lopez to repre-
sent all of thcm. Mr. Lopez had been admitted to practice for 
only about six months before the trial. He represents Meyers 
on this appeal. Other counsel were appointed to represent 
Chacon and Noah on appeal. After a brief consultation with 
Mr. Lopez, Chacon, Noah, and Meyers pleaded not guilty and 
not guilty by reason of insanity; Garcia pleaded not guilty. 
At their next appearance, Mr. Lopez informed the court that 
Chacon and Noah wished to represent themselves, that Garcia, 
who was not present, wished separate counsel, and that only 
Meyers still wished Mr. Lopez to represent him.2 
After briefly questioning Chacon and Noah, the court dis-
missed Mr. Lopez as their counsel but appointed him to act as 
their advisor during the trial. On the day set for trial, Mr. 
Lopez informed the court that Chacon and Noah had changed 
their minds, that they wanted him to represent them as well 
as Meyers, and that he was willing to do so because he was 
already familiar with the case. With the consent of Chacon 
and Noah, the court reappointed Mr. Lopez, and the trial 
proceeded. At no time did the court indicate to either Chacon, 
Noah, or M~yers that separate counsel might be appointed for 
each of them. The only choice they had was to accept Mr. 
Lopez or proceed without an attorney. 
[2] The right to counsel at trial guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution (Gideon v. 
Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335 [9 L.Ed.2d 799, 83 8.Ct. 792, 
2The discussion between Mr. Lopez and the court indicates that Mr. 
Lopez was aware that other counsel could be appointed if he felt that 
there was a conflict of interest between any of the defendants. "Mr. 
Lopez: (Interrupting) Well, Your Honor, before proceeding I'd like to 
inform the court that the defendant Garcia wishes to have another attor-
ney appointed to defend him. He'S the one that is not present today. 
I might say that there's some conflict of interest between his case and 
the other three defendants that are present today, but be has informed 
me by Jetter he doesn't want me anymore, that he wants the court to 
appoint another attorney for him." 
,) 
) 
, / 
.j 
'.!I!.: i 1 
! ! 
i; 
l ~ 
j I i; 
I' 
! : 
, 
, ' 
774 PEOl'I£ V. CHACON [69 C.2d 
------_._--- ------~.--... -----
93 A.J~.R.2d 733]) and article I, scction 13 of the California 
Constitution does not indude un automatic right 1.0 xl'parate 
counsel for cadi codt>fl'ndant. Out> counsel may repl'f'x(,llt more 
than olle defendant so long as the represcntation is effective. 
(Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45, 71 [77 L.Ed. 158, 171-
172, 53 S.Ct. 55, 84 A.L.R. 527].) [3] Effective assistance 
of counsel is assistance ,. untrammeled and unimpaired by a 
court order requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously 
reprt>sent conflicting interests." (Glasser v. United States 
(1942) 315 U.S. 60, 70 [86 hEd. 680, 699, 62 8.Ct. 457]; 
l'fople v. Dougla.~ (1964) 61 Cal.2d 430, 437 [38 Cal.Rptr. 
884, 392 P.2d 964].) If counsel must represent conflicting 
interests or is ineffective because of the burdens of represent-
ing more than one def(:'Ildant, the injured defendant has been 
denied his constitutional right to effective counsel. (United 
States v. Gla,sser, supra; People v. Robinson (1954) 42 Cal.2d 
741, 745-748 [269 P.2d 6] ; People v. Lanigan (1943) 22 Cal. 
2d 569, 576-577 [140 P.2d 24, 148 A.L.R. 176]; People v. 
Douglas, supra; People v. Donphoe (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 17, 
24 [19 Cal.Rptr. 454].) i 
[4] If defendants were denied the right to effective repre-
sentation of counsel, we cannot presume that the right was 
waived by a failure to request separate counsel. The court did 
not advise them of their right to separate counsel if a conflict 
was present, and we cannot imply from their silence a waiver 
of that right. (Carnley v. Cochran (1962) 369 U.S. 506, 515 
f8 I~.Ed.2d 70, 76-77, 82 8.Ct. 884] ; In re Johnson (1965) 62 
Ca1.2d 325, 333 [42 Cal.Rptr. 228, 398 P.2d 420] ; Lollar v. 
United States (D.C. Cir. 1967) 376 F.2d 243, 245; Ford v. 
United States (D.C. Cir. 1967) 379 F.2d 123, 125.) Insofar 8S 
People v. Winklespecht (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 227, 230 [46 
Cal.Rptr. 697]; People v. BY"d (1964) 228 CaI.App.2d 646, 
649-650 [39 Cal.Rptr. 644]; and People v. Sprinkle (1962) 
201 Ca1.App;2d 277, 282 [19 Cal.Rptr. 804], are to the con-
trary. they are disapproved. These cases have not been fol-
lowed on this point in recent cases discussing the right to 
separate counsel. (See People v. George (1968) 259 Cal.App. 
2d 424-432 [66 Cal.Rptr. 442] [no conflict found]; People 
v. Watkins (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 603, 606 [56 Cal.Rptr. 
734] [no conflict found] ; and People v. Keesee (1967) 250 
Cal.App.2d 794,798 [58 Cal.Rptr. 780] [conflict found, judg-
ment reversed, hearing denied] .) In addition, they all 
refrained from basing affirmance solely on the procedural 
ground that the defendant had not objected to multiple repre-
sentation in the trial court. 
) 
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[5] Conflicts of intcrcst necessarily exist when the jury 
must fix. the penalty for more than one defendant. Oftt'll the 
strongest argument that separate counsel can make 011 the 
issue of penalty is that his client was less culpable than the 
others and that he, at least, should not be executed. In addi-
tion, he must be free to stress particular mitigating elemellts 
in hi~ client's background or other individual mitigating fac-
tors that may not apply to a codefendant. Counsel represent-
ing more than one defendant is necessarily inhibited in mak-
ing such arguments and in presenting evidence to support 
them. He cannot simultaneously arguc with any semblance of 
effectiveness that each defendant is most deserving of the 
lesser penalty. Moreover, the conflict is not limited to the trial 
on the issue of penalty, for normally the same jury determilles 
both the issue of guilt and the issue of penalty. Counsel must 
therefore conduct the defense throughout the entire trial to 
stress evidence and considerations to support the lesser pen-
alty. Counsel appointed to represent more than one defendant 
when the jury must fix the penalty for each is forced, as Mr. 
Lopez was forced in this case, to treat his client!\ as a group 
and to abandon arguments that would apply to each sepa-
rately. 
[lb] Since a common defense was presented by counsel 
representing aU three defendants, the record is silent as to 
evidence that might have been developed on behalf of each 
defendant had he been separately represented. Nevertheless, 
the facts of the case are fraught with potentially effective 
individual defenses. On the basis of the defense testimony, 
defendant Noah had the strongest case for self-defense in that 
he was the one Smith first attacked. Defendant Meyers 
entered the fray to defend his "brother" Noah, and then was 
attacked himself. Defendant Chacon did not attack the victim 
at all. Mr. I.JOpez made no attempt to develop these differences. 
In his cross-examination of the guards, he made no effort to 
develop weaknesses or inconsistencies in their testimony with 
respect to any of the defendants separately. He made JlO 
attempt to determine whether the guards might have erred in 
their description of the incident so as to give rise to a reason-
able doubt as to one or another of the defendants' guilt. 
Separate counsel for Chacon could have argued to the jury 
t118t, regardless of who started the fight, all defense witnesses 
exonerated Chacon and that the guards could llave been mis-
taken in believing that aU three took turns in atttaeking 
Smith. 
I J 
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Separate counsel for Noah could have argued that he struck 
only in self-defense and that what the guards observed there-
after was Chacon and Meyers taking advantage of the turmoil 
to vent their rage on Smith. Separate counsel for Meyers 
could have made similar contentions. 
Mr. Lopez could not make these arguments in favor of each 
defendant to dissociate him from his codefendants' cases, for 
he represented them all and had to make common cause for 
them. This unified posture of the defense is revealed most 
clearly by an examination of the closing argument at the trial 
on the issue of guilt. The summation so merged the three 
defendants that at one point, the judge himself felt compelled 
to interrupt and point out that the jury could return a differ-
ent verdict for each defendant. As the court said in People v. 
Donohoe (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 17, 28 [19 Cal.Rptr. 454] : 
"\Ve think that it is a fair assumption that the argument of 
defense counsel must of necessity have been restricted in its 
scope and in places restrained in its tone by an ever present 
concern that his comments on behalf of one defendant did not 
injure or offend the other. " 
The extent of the conflict of interest in this case is demon-
strated by the fate of the fourth defendant, Garcia. Hi$ 
defense was as consistent with the others' defense as theirs 
was among themselves: all the prosecution witnesses impli-
cated Garcia, whereas all the defense witnesses exonerated 
him. His defense was identical with that of Chacon, in that 
neither attacked Smith. Garcia, however, was represented by 
separate counsel who developed weaknesses in the evidence as 
it pertained to Garcia. He stressed the distance the guards 
were from Garcia's cell, the amount of lighting in the tier, 
the difficulty in depth perception when looking at a long line 
of cells. The result was that Garcia alone secured a hung 
jury. 
The extent of the conflict of interest and its impact on Mr. 
Lopez's effectiveness, was certainly not so slight that we can 
ignore it.3 [6] As the Supreme Court said in Glasser, 315 
U.S. 60, S1tpra, at page 76 [86 hEd. 680 at p. 702], "The 
aSeveral United States Courts of Appeals have adopted much the Bame 
position that we take here. In Lollar v. United States, supra, 376 F.2d 
243,247, the court stated: "[O)nly where' "we can find no basis in the 
record for an informed speculation" that appellant's rights were preju-
dicially affected,' can the conviction stand .... In effect, we adopt the 
IItandard of 'reasonable doubt,' II standard the Supreme Court recently 
said must govern whenever the prosecution coutends the denial ot a con· 
Rtitlltional right is merely harmless error." See also Campbell v. United 
States (D.C. Cir. 1965) 352 F.2d 359, 360-361 [122 App.D.C. 143]; 
Sawyer v. Brough (4th Cir. 1966) 358 F.2d 70, 73·74. 
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right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and 
absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to 
the amount of prejudice arising from its denial. " 
We turn now to other issues that may arise on retrial. 
[7a] Defendants Noah and Chacon contend that the 
prosecutor committed misconduct in emphasizing their prior 
felony convictions at the outset of the trial. The records 
officer at Soledad was the first witness for the prosecution. He 
testified that each of the four defendants was serving a life 
term at the time of the incident and listed all the convictions 
for which each was serving time, a total of nine violent or 
dangerous felonies for all of them.' Defense counsel did not 
object to this testimony or to the introduction of copies of the 
commitment records and the summaries of sentence data. 
The evidence of these prior convictions was admissible to 
prove that each was serving a life term at the time of the 
assault on Smith. [8] When a prior conviction is an essen-
tial element of an offense, it is admitted to prove something 
other than the defendant's bad character, and is admissible 
for that purpose. II (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b); People v. 
DoraWo (1965) 62 Ca1.2d 338, 358 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 
361] ; People v. Wells (1949) 33 Cal.2d 330, 338 [202 P.2d 
53).) 
[7b] Nevertheless, we feel that the prejudicial effect of 
this cumulative testimony outweighed the legitimate purposes 
served by its admission. The impact of this testimony cannot 
be overstated: at the outset of the trial, the jury was pre-
sented with the picture of four hardened, vicious convicts 
charged with another offense in a long line of similar violent 
'Chacon had been eonvicted of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187), 
second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), possession of a weapon by an 
inmate (Pen. Code, § 4502), and battel'y by an inmate on a non·inmate 
(Pen. Code, § 4501.5). Noah's eonvictions were for aggravated assault 
by a nonlife termer (Pen. Code, § 4501), attempted escape by force or 
violence from the county jail (Pen. Code, § 4532), and assault with a 
deadly weapon on a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 245). Meyers had been 
convicted of aggravated assault by a nonlife termer (Pen. Code, § 4501). 
Garcia had been convicted of possession of a deadly weapon by an inmate 
(Pen. Code, § 4502). 
liThe evidence concerning Chacon's conviction for battery on a nou-
inmate (Pen. Code, § 4501.5) could not have been admitted for this pur-
pose siuce it does not carry a maximum life sentence. Since the conviction 
was for a recent similar offense, bowever, it was admissible to prove 
malice and to negate Cbacon's defense of non-involvement exeept as a 
peacemaker. (People v. Wells, supra, 33 Ca1.2d 330, 339-343; McCormick, 
Evidence, § 157, pp. 329-330 (1954); Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2,) ed. ]966) 
§ 345, and cases cited therein.) For this purpose, howe,'!',', it eould be 
introduced as rebuttal, for it will only be nfter tIl(' defense has presented 
its case that the defense contcntions will bc known. 
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offenses. Even the most conscientious juror would be hard 
pressed to concentrate solely on the facts of the crime charged 
in the indictment. Both defense counsel were willing to stipu-
late that the four defendants were serving life terms. The ) 
prosecuting attorney, however, would agree to such a stipula- f 
. tion only if the commitment records were admitted for his use 
in argument. He thus indicated both full awareness of the 
prejudicial effect of this testimony and a wish to make full 
advantage of it. Thc prosecution could have established the 
fact that the defendants are life termers in a less prejudicial 
way than that undertaken here. 
[9] Both Chacon and Noah contend that the jury was 
prejudiced in that each defendant appeared throughout the 
trial handcuffed and in prison garb. It appears that all J' 
defendants were similarly treated for at least some parts of 
the trial. No leg chains were used, and there is no evidence of \' 
excessive use of guards in the courtroom. There was no objec-
tion to the handcuffs or the clothing. On several occasions 
during the voir dit·c, the trial judge, prosecuting attorney, \ 
and defense attorney mentioned the handcuffs and inquired 
whether the jury would be affected by them in making their 
decision. All responses were negative. In his argument to the 
jury on the issue of guilt, the prosecutor emphasized that the 
jury should not be prejudiced against defendants because 
they were in handcuffs; defense eounsel admonished the jury 
to the same effect and did not request the court to give a simi- I' 
lar admonition. 
[10] A defendant may be required to undergo reasonable' 
restraints when they are necessary to assure his detention or 
to maintain order in the courtroom. (People v. Kimball 
(1936)5 Cal.2d 608, 611 [55 P.2d 483] ; People v. Burnett 
(1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 651, 655 [59 Cal.Rptr. 652].) The 
restraints in this case were reasonable. Apparently counsel 
did not think them improper, for he did not object to them. 
In a case such as this one the use of handcuffs was not unrea-
sonable. (Peoplc v. Ross (1967) 67 Ca1.2d 64, 71-72 [60 Cal. 
Hptr. 254, 429 P.2d 606], revd. 011 other grounds 391 U.S. 470 
[20 L.Ed.2d 750, 88 S.Ct. 1850] ; Pcople v. Burwell (1955) 44 
Cal.2d 16, 33 [279 P.2d 744] ; People v. Chcssman (1951) 38 
Ca1.2d 166,176 [238 P.2d 1001].) Nor do we find any error in 
the use of prison garb. The defendants did not object to being 
tried ill -prison clothing and show no prejudice arising from 
it. (Cf. People v. Zapata (1963) 220 Ca1.App.2d 903, 911 r34 
Cal.Hptr. ]7]] ; Peoplc v. Garcia (]954) ]24 Cal.App.2u 822, 
824 [269 P.2d 673J.) 
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[11] Dcfendants complain that the use of Smith and two 
correctional officers, DeBord and Weber, as prosecut.ion wit-
neSSl'S was part of an invidious scheme to discredit dcfense 
witnesses. 
The victim, Smith, testified for the prosecution. He stated 
that he had started the fight; that defendant Chacon had not 
been iuvolved j that he llad spoken with Officer DeBord shortly 
after the incitlent but had not implicated defendants and had 
not said that he would refuse to testify for the state out of 
fear; and t.hat he did not presently fear tile defendants. 
Officer DeBord, correctional counselor at San Quent.in, tlH'n 
testified to a convprsation with Smith approximately one 
mont.h after the incident. Over the objection of Garcia's coun-
sel that the conversation was hearsay and impeaclllnent with-
out foundation, DeBord testined that Smith said nothing 
about his starting the fight, that he said all four defendants 
had stabbed him, that he would not testify for the state 
because he did not wish to be considered an informer, and 
that he would testify for the defendants. 
Officer Weber, correctional officer at Soledad, then testified 
regarding the "convicts' code," which he said he had seen in 
operation in many prisons. The "convicts' code" was 
described as an unwritten rule that prison inmates be silent 
about prison disciplinary matters. He testified that he had 
often seen prisoners refuse to make any statement implicating 
fellow inmates beeause of fear of reprisal. 
This evidence was admissible. The prosecution's use of 
Smith as a witness was not calculated merely to open the door 
to impeachment of defense witnesses or the exculpatory testi-
mony of Smith himself. Smith was the victim of the assault 
and was thus a necessary witness in the prosecution's case. 
He testified that he was attacked but went on to exculpate 
defendants and to affirm their defense. His tcstimony was eva-
sive and uncooperative. In such a situation, impeachment of 
one's own witness is entirely proper. (Evid. Code, § 785; 
People v. Johnson (1968) 68 Cal.2d 646, 650-651 [68 Cal. 
Rptr. 599,441 P.2d 111] ; People v. Stanley (1967) 67 Ca1.2d 
812,816, fn. 1 [63 Cal.Rptr. 825,433 P.2d 913].) [12] One 
of the purposes of section 785 of the Evidence Code is to allow 
a· party to use and impeach a hostile witness that he had 
called. (Comment of the Law Revision Commission to Evid. 
Code, § 785; Tentative Recommendation and a Study Relating 
to the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 6 Cal. Law Revision Com. 
Rep. (1964), comment to rule 20.) 
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[13] Dt'Bol"d testified t]lat in his previous statem('nt, 
Smith had describpd the ev('nt differently and indicated fear 
of the defendants. The usc of a prior inconsistent statement to 
impeach was proper. (Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (h); McCor-
mick, Evidence, § 34.) DeBord's testimony as to Smith's fear 
of defendants was also admissible to show bias of the witness 
in favor of defendants. (Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (f) ; McCor-
mick, Evidence, § 40; People v. Sweeney (1960) 55 Ca1.2d 27, 
39-44 [9 Cal.Rptr. 793, 357 P.2d 1049].) 
[14] 'Veber testified to conditions generally existing in 
prisons and their effect on the veracity of prisoners. His testi-
mony was relevant (People v. De La Roi (1943) 23 Ca1.2d 
692,696 [146 P.2d 225,151 P.2d 837]), and was admissible to 
show circumstances affecting the bias of the witness. (Evid. 
Code, § 780, subd. (f); People v. Pickens (1923) 61 Cal.App. 
405, 407, 409 [214 P. 1027]; People v. Krug (1935) 10 
Cal,.App.2d 172; 176 [51 P.2d 445].) The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in finding that Weber was qualified as an 
t\xpCl't. (Evid. Coue, § 720; People v. Clay (1964) 227 Cal. 
App.2d 87, 98 [38 Cal.Uptr. 431, 100 A.L.R.2d 1421].) 
']'he cases cited by ueft-lluunts are not in point. Weber did 
not give his opinion of the guilt or innocence of the defend-
ants (People v. jJla.~un (19GO) 183 Cal.App.2d 168, 173 [6 
Cal.Rptr. 649]), of Smith's intellt (People v. Davis (1941) 47 
Cal.App.2d 331, 334 [117 P.2d 917]; cf. People v. Cohen 
(1941) 48 CaI.App.2d 459, 464 [119 P.2d 995]), or of the 
meaning of a statute. (People v. /(usc (1890) 85 Cal. 378, 382 
[24 P. 817].) Nor did Webl'l' testify to any similar acts by 
Smith (People v. Nelson (1928) 90 Ca1.App. 27, 34 [265 P. 
366]; People v. Stewart (1890) 85 CuI. 174,175 [24 P. 722].) 
Weber testified, not that Smith was lying, but that the condi-
tions under which he lived might compel him to lie. 
[15] Although the point was not raised in the briefs, our 
examination of the record has convinced us that the instruc-
tions on malice aforethought were inadequate.1I [16] Penal 
liThe trial judge gave the following instructions: "An essential ele-
ment of the offense stated in Section 4500 of the Penal Code is that the 
assault bc conlmitted with malice lIfOI·ctholight. As used in Section 4500, 
that term denotcs 'purpose and deHign in contradistinction to accident 
and mischance ..• it is used to denote the purpose and design of the 
assaulting party.' In order to establish guilt under 4500 Penal Code, it 
is not required that the assault be lIla<le with intent to kill." This does 
not adequately describe the state of mind constituting malice afore-
thought, and we disapprove its URC. ,]'h ... tl'ial courts should follow the 
definitions developed under ~ections 187 and 1~!8 in instructing on malice 
aforethought. 
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Code section 4500 expressly requires that an assault punish-
able tllerein must be "with malice aforetllOugllt." The words 
malice aforE'thought in section 4500 have the same meaning as 
in sections 187 and 188. (People v. McNabb (1935) 3 Ca1.2d 
44], 456 [45 P.2d 334J ; People v. Wells (1949) 33 Ca1.2d 330, 
338 [202 P.2d 53J ; see People v. Berry (1955) 44 Ca1.2d 426, 
430 r 282 P .2d 861].) Thus the rules that have evolved regard-
ing malice aforethought as an element in a cllarge of murder 
apply to section 4500. 
[17] In the instant case, defendants requested an instruc-
tion on thp issue of provocation. This request was denied, 
although the judge did instruct on the issue of self-defense. 
The rrfusal to give the requested instruction was erroneous. 
In a prosf'cution for murder the presence of sufficient provoca-
tion or hl'at of passion negates the existence of the requisitl' 
malice aforethought. (People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Ca1.2d 
121, 132 [169 P.2d 1].) In tJle usual case, this instruction 
supplplnf'nts th~ self-defense instruction. Thus, in a prospcu-
tion for murder, even though the defense of self-defense fails, 
8JI it might for etxcessive retaliation by the defendant, the jury 
might still flnd the original attack sufficipnt to constitute prov-
ocation, which would preclude a finding of malice aforethought 
and reduce the crime to manslaughter. Since the refusal to 
instruct on provocation would be erronpous in a prosecution 
for Ulurdt'r, it was erroneous here. 
1\. closely analogous situation involves the defense of dimin-
isJled capaeity. This defense, now established in murder prosp-
cutions (People v. McDowell (1968) ante, p. 737 [73 Cal.Rptr. 
1, 447 P.2d 97]), was originally applied in a prosecution 
tion undE'1' seetion 4500. (People v. Wells (1949) 33 Ca1.2d 
330, 343-346 [202 P.2d 53].) The analogy is particularly apt 
in that a finding of diminished capacity, like a finding of 
proyoeation. clln also negate the existence of malice afoTf'-
thought. (People \'. Conley (1966) 64 Cal.2d 310, 3] 8 [49 
Cal.Rptr. id5, 411 P.2d 911J.) 
The judgments are reversed. 
MeComb, J., Peters, .J .. Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., 
and Rullh'an, .J., concurred. 
RespondE'nt's petition for a rehearing was denied Decem-
ber 24, 1968, and the opiuion was modified to read as printed 
above. 
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